

# Using Architectural Properties to Model System-Wide Graceful Degradation

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# **Scalable Graceful Degradation**

#### Graceful degradation can increase system dependability

- Individual component and subsystem failures reduce functionality but do not cause a system failure
- Non-critical features shed while critical features are preserved
- Current practice for specifying graceful degradation: [Herlihy91]
  - Specify a "relaxation lattice" of system constraints
    - Constraints are relaxed as failures occur
  - Lattice is exponentially complex with number of constraints
  - Must specify a specific system response for each lattice point

#### *IDEA:* Exploit system decomposition into subsystems and components

• *Goal:* Create a more scalable model for graceful degradation

## **Focus: Dependable Embedded Systems**

#### Embedded systems are increasingly software driven

- Complex software systems necessary to implement more features and functionality
- "Smart" sensors and actuators encourage more distributed/networked systems

#### But, they have high dependability requirements...

- System failures have high consequences (loss of life, money)
- Software patch or upgrade is often impractical

#### ... and are extremely cost sensitive

• System-wide replication for dependability is cost prohibitive

#### How can we get scalable, graceful degradation for them?

# **Utility and Graceful Degradation**

#### ◆ Utility - measure of system's usefulness

- Different for each problem domain
- Incorporate functionality, reliability, performance, etc.

#### System Utility is a function of component utilities

- Maximum Utility All system components working
- Some Utility degraded system operation
- Zero Utility System failure

#### Graceful Degradation goal:

- Component failures proportionately reduce system utility
- Ideally, each functional subsystem retains residual functionality
  - Previous work assumed whole-subsystem failures, not component failures

# **Key Is Handling System Configurations**

#### Focus on software component configurations

- Assume individual software components either working or failed
- $2^n$  possible configurations of *n* software components
  - Each configuration can be represented as a string of n bits


#### For sufficient graceful degradation we want:

- Many valid configurations
- System bit string values with low Hamming distance have small differences in utility

#### Previous work considered the subsystem level

- What if instead we looked at fine grain component level?
- "n" goes from a handful to perhaps hundreds
- Analysis complexity is O(2<sup>n</sup>) are we crazy?

## **Example Elevator System Architecture**



# **Utility Analysis**

#### ◆ Utility analysis for all system configurations is O(2<sup>n</sup>)

- But, we are only interested in valid configurations
  - Correct sensors and actuators present for desired functionality

#### Software architecture constrains valid configurations

- Component and interface definitions
- Organization of components into subsystems
- Dependencies between subsystems

#### Develop system model for scalable analysis

- System data flow graph derived from interfaces among components
- *Feature subsets* defined from subgraphs of components

## **Feature Subsets**

- A *feature subset* is a subset of components that outputs a set of system variables
  - Defined by component output interfaces
  - A feature subset with  $k \ll n$  components has  $2^k$  configurations
  - Each feature subset defines (potentially overlapping) subsystems

#### Allow hierarchical definition of subsystems

• Feature subsets can contain other feature subsets as components


#### ♦ Identify critical and non-critical feature subsets

• System utility is zero when critical feature subset's utility is zero

#### Finding valid system configurations made easier:

- Only determine valid configurations for each critical feature subset
- Exploit fact that many systems have decoupled subsystems

## **Drive Control Feature Subsets**



## Conclusions

- Our system model for graceful degradation enables scalable system analysis
  - Use feature subset definitions to simplify configuration analysis
    - Only consider subsets of each configuration bit string relevant to a feature subset
    - If average feature subset has k << n components, analysis reduces from O(2<sup>n</sup>) to O(n/k \* 2<sup>k</sup>)
  - Can determine all valid configurations without examining every possible component configuration
    - Encapsulate graceful degradation analysis within each subsystem

#### Model provides structured view of system-wide graceful degradation

- Identify system properties that improve graceful degradation
- Identify critical subsystems that require extra redundancy
- Basis to compare graceful degradation of similar configurations