



Verification and Validation of a Fault-Tolerant Architectural Abstraction

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- ◆ Fault tolerance at the architectural level
 - ◆ idealised fault tolerant architectural element
 - ◆ exception handling
- ◆ Fault tolerance doesn't come for free
 - ◆ increase in complexity
 - ◆ e.g., exception propagation
- ◆ Improve confidence
 - ◆ verification by model checking architectural configurations
 - ◆ validation by generation of test cases
- ◆ How the abstraction is implemented is not the topic of this paper

- ◆ Motivation
- ◆ Exception handling and software fault tolerance
- ◆ Idealised fault tolerant architectural element
- ◆ Rigorous development approach
- ◆ Conclusions
- ◆ Future work


An architectural solution based on **exception handling**

- ◆ components need to collaborate for handling certain failure scenarios
- ◆ configurations that allow the propagation of exceptions
 - ◆ controlled error propagation

Exception handling is not “the” solution, there are other alternatives


- ◆ it might be perceived as undesirable, but it's reality
- ◆ depends on the failure assumptions and costs

◆ Idealised fault tolerant architectural element (iFTE)




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
system ifte_abstraction
features
  I_ifTE_PS_i: in event data port Service;
  I_ifTE_PS_o: out event data port Service;
  I_ifTE_PE_o: out event data port Exception;
  I_ifTE_RS_i: in event data port Service;
  I_ifTE_RS_o: out event data port Service;
  I_ifTE_RE_i: in event data port Exception;
flows
  Ret_Ser_a: flow path I_ifTE_PS_i -> I_ifTE_PS_o;
  Sig_Exc_a: flow path I_ifTE_PS_i -> I_ifTE_PE_o;
  Req_Ser_b: flow path I_ifTE_PS_i -> I_ifTE_RS_o;
  Ret_Ser_b: flow path I_ifTE_RS_i -> I_ifTE_PS_o;
  Sig_Exc_b: flow path I_ifTE_RS_i -> I_ifTE_PE_o;
  Ret_Ser_c: flow path I_ifTE_RE_i -> I_ifTE_PS_o;
  Sig_Exc_c: flow path I_ifTE_RE_i -> I_ifTE_PE_o;
end ifte_abstraction;
  
```



The main objectives of the approach

- ◆ Provide support for analysing exception propagation at the architectural level
- ◆ Analyse application-specific details about the exception propagation
- ◆ Define a scalable solution with support for automatic verification
- ◆ Define an approach for generating testing cases





- ◆ For each service of an iFTE
 - ◆ Provided interfaces
 - ◆ Required interfaces
 - ◆ Provided exceptions
 - ◆ Required exceptions
 - ◆ Maskable exceptions
- ◆ For the software architecture
 - ◆ The architectural configuration

B-Method

- ◆ Type representation
 - ◆ different contexts for each type of exceptions
- ◆ Easiness to represent relations between types
 - ◆ architectural configuration, exception conversions, etc.

CSP

- ◆ Easiness to represent complex ordered events
 - ◆ execution scenarios, complex architectural propagation rules

The ProB model checker is used to check for both

- ◆ Violations of structural (architectural configuration) constraints
- ◆ Extended architectural descriptions are used to analyse exception flow properties

Users can specify their own properties for a specific exception handling model


Violations result in error messages and counter-examples

Some architectural properties that are verified

- ◆ Absence of deadlock
- ◆ Explicit declaration of external exceptions (component interfaces)
- ◆ All the required exceptions are handled
- ◆ Only maskable exceptions can be masked

- ◆ Integration order tries to minimise dependencies among architectural elements
- ◆ Reduce the integration test effort for constructing stubs
- ◆ Provides a way for reasoning about the coupling among architectural elements (dependency matrix)

- ◆ The only input is the formal model (B + CSP) of the software architecture
- ◆ A graph is created for representing the interaction among architectural elements
- ◆ Test cases are identified based on the paths of the interaction graph
- ◆ Stubs are specified by analysing the arrows departing from the required interfaces nodes



- ◆ 7 iFTE architectural elements: 4 comps. and 3 conns.
- ◆ 4 non-iFTE architectural components


Architecture configuration property


- ◆ every required service refers to a valid provided service of another component.

The following goal might never be satisfied:

- ◆ $\exists c1, c2 \in \text{ArchitecturalElements}, t \in \text{EventType}, s \in \text{ArchitecturalServices}, e \in \text{ArchitecturalExceptions} \cdot$
 $(c1, c2, t, s, e) \in \text{sequenceHistory} \wedge c1 \neq c2 \wedge s \notin \text{providedArchService}(c2)$

The architectural elements of an iFTE follow recursively the iFTE abstraction





Fault tolerance at the architectural level

- ◆ error handling
 - ◆ since iFTE is application dependent, we need to obtain assurances when it is instantiated to a particular application
 - ◆ model checking specifications for exception propagation
 - ◆ ProB (B Method and CSP)
 - ◆ generation of testing cases for integration testing

- ◆ Adapt the proposed approach to other architectural abstractions using other fault models, e.g., crash failures
- ◆ Improve the tool support for:
 - ◆ Generating the formal models from a UML component diagram (*UML2Formal*)
 - ◆ Additional information about the exceptional behaviour can be represented in XMI through meta tags